```
Approved For Release 2008/08/13 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001403390007-0
                                      SECRET
     MSGNO
              65 (STXX)
                               *14/07/82* *04:54*
                          Z 1A
     ZCZC
           09:51:39Z (ST)
                                                                            25X1
                                      SECRET
                                                              STATE
(
(
     82 9028133
                   SSR
                                                              NC 9028133
                                    TOR: 140701Z JUL 82
     RR RUEATIB
     ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
     STU6545
     RR RUEHC
     DE RUFHFR #3921/01 1941505
     ZNY SSSSS ZZH
     R 131503Z JUL 82
     FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
     TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9485
(
     RUFHPP/ALL EC CAPITALS
     BT
                               State Dept. review completed
     EZ1:
€.
     SEGRET PARIS 23921
     EXDIS \
    £72:
    STATE FOR JAMES BUCKLEY, PASS TO NSC FOR WILLIAM CLARK,
     COMMERCE FOR OLMER, CEFENSE FOR FRED IKLE
     E.O. 12065: GDS 7/12/88 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G. ) OR-M
     TAGS: PGOV, ETRG, FR
     SUBJ: THE STRATEGIC JUSTIFICATION FOR PIPELINE SANCTIONS
     REF: PARIS 23676
     1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
         IT WOULD APPEAR FROM CONVERSATIONS I HAVE HAD IN
     FRANCE THAT THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF OUR PIPELINE
     SANCTIONS IS NOT WIDELY UNDERSTOCD.
                                          I SET FORTH
     MY ANALYSIS OF OUR STRATEGY, INVITING COMMENT.
         THE BACKGROUND IS THAT THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS IN
     TROUBLE. APART FROM THE SYSTEM ITSELF THERE ARE
     SEVERAL PROBLEMS: THERE IS A SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF
     FOREIGN CURRENCY IN RELATION TO THEIR EXPANSIONARY FIVE
     YEAR PLANS. IN COMMERCIAL TERMS A RAPID EXPANSION
     WAS COMMITTED FOR BASED ON A CASH FLOW WHICH HAS
     NOT MATERIALIZED, I.E. LIKE BRANIFF AIRWAYS THEY
     EXTENDED THEMSELVES AT THE WRONG TIME. THE CASH
     FLOW IS DOWN BECAUSE OF THE DROP IN SPOT OIL PRICES,
     AS WELL AS PRICES OF DIAMONDS, GOLD AND OTHER RAW
                 POOR HARVESTS, POLAND, AND EASTERN
     EUROPEAN RESCHEDULING HAVE AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION.
     CONSEQUENTLY, THE CREDIT STANDING OF THE SOVIET UNION
     IS UNDER SEVERE SCRUTINY AND IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A
     BALANCE OF PAYMENTS LOAN BASED ON THE CREDIT OF THE
                                      SECRET
(-
                Approved For Release 2008/08/13 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001403390007-0
```

€

C

 \mathbf{C}

(

```
SECRET
         65 (STXX)
                     21A
                          *14/87/82* *04:54*
MSGNQ
SOVIET UNION COULD BE ARRANGED TODAY.
    THE CURRENT SCVIET PLAN IS TO INCREASE THEIR GAS
PRODUCTION BY ABOUT 50 PCT. ONLY ABOUT 15 PCT. OF
THIS INCREASE WILL GO TO JESTERN EUROPE, JHILE 85 PCT.
WILL BE USED TO ENERGIZE SOVIET INDUSTRY WITH GAS.
THIS CHANGEOVER TO GAS WILL NOT ONLY COMPENSATE
FOR FALLING CIL PRODUCTION AND ALLOW FOR CIL TO
BE EXPORTED. IT WILL SET THE BASE FOR FURTHER
INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE NOT BE
            IN OTHER WORDS THE SOVIET EXPORTS OF GAS
POSSIBLE.
ARE GOING TO PAY FOR THE PIPELINE WHICH WILL TRANSFORM
AND EXPAND THE SOVIET ENERGY BASE WHICH IN TURN
SHOULD HAVE A PROFCUAC BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON SOVIET
 INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY CAPABILITY. I REALIZE I MAY
BE OVERSTATING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PIPELINE AND
THAT MANY OTHER FACTORS CAN DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC
 SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE SOVIET UNION.
 BUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NATURAL GAS IS
 WITHOUT DOUBT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS IN
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE SOVIET UNION.
     THE SOVIET SYSTEM IS STRAINED AND TO BUILD THIS
 PIPELINE THE SOVIETS MUST IMPORT MATERIALS SUCH
 AS LARGE PIPE AND LARGE COMPRESSORS.
                                       DENYING THEM
 PRODUCTS SUCH AS ROTORS WHICH COME FROM GE TECHNOLOGY
 REQUIRES THE SOVIETS TO DO SOMETHING ELSE LIKE
 REDESIGN, REDIRECT THEIR OWN CAPACITIES, PROCURE
 ELSEWHERE, ETC.; THIS MEANS DELAYS, AND WHEN THEIR
 CASH FLOW IS DOWN AND THEIR CREDIT STANDING IS
 FADING. DELAYS COULD MEAN SERIOUS PROBLEMS.
 PIPELINE COULD BE DELAYED BEYOND THE PERIOD NEEDED,
 TO COMPENSATE FOR THE ROTORS. THE QUESTION I POSE
 IS WHY SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BAIL THE SOVIET
. UNION OUT OF ITS PROBLEMS BY ALLOWING IT THE USE OF
 OUR TECHNOLOGY?
     THE CONTRACTED-FOR GAS EXPORTS TO EUROPE WILL
 PROBABLY BE MET EVEN THOUGH THE PIPELINE IS DELAYED
 BUT ONLY BY DRAWING GAS FROM SOME OTHER USE IN
 THE SYSTEM, ALL CF WHICH ADDS TO THE OVERALL STRAIN.
 NOR WILL THE CASH THAT COMES FROM THESE EXPORTS OF
 GAS SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS BECAUSE MOST OF IT WILL
 BE DEVOTED FOR SEVERAL YEARS TO PAYING FOR THE
 NEW PIPELINE.
     I DO (NOT LOOK UPON THIS ISSUE AS ONE OF
 EUROPEAN DEPENDENCY (UNLESS THERE IS A THIRD
 SOVIET TRANCHE TO EUROPE, I.E., A SECOND PIPELINE).
(NOR IS THE DOLLARS 8 TO 10 BILLION NEW CASH GENERATED BY
 GAS SALES TO EUROPE THE RANKING PRIORITY OF CONCERN.
 BAD AS IT IS, BECAUSE THAT CASH WILL BE USED FOR
 SEVERAL YEARS TO PAY FOR THE IMPORTED MATERIALS.
 IMPORTANT POINT IS THE SOVIETS ARE IN ECONOMIC
 TROUBLE BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN DOING AND THEIR
 OWN SYSTEM AND THE UNITED STATES IS PERFECTLY JUSTIFIED
 IN NOT CHOOSING TO HELP THEM MAKE THE QUANTUM LEAP
 FORWARD THAT WILL COME FROM THEIR EXPANDED USE OF
 GAS. OUR POLICY NEED NOT BE CHARACTERIZED AS ECONOMIC
 WARFARE; IT IS SIMPLY A DECISION NOT TO BAIL THEM OUT
 EXDIS
 STATE FOR JAMES BUCKLEY, PASS TO NSC FOR WILLIAM CLARK,
 COMMERCE FOR OLMER, CEFENSE FOR FRED IKLE
```

Approved For Release 2008/08/13 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001403390007-0

```
SECRET
                         *14/D7/82* *D4:54*
         65 (STXX)
                    21A
SOVIET UNION CCULD BE ARRANGED TCDAY.
    THE CURRENT SCVIET PLAN IS TO INCREASE THEIR GAS
PRODUCTION BY ABOUT 50 PCT. ONLY ABOUT 15 PCT. OF
THIS INCREASE WILL GO TO WESTERN EUROPE, WHILE 85 PCT.
WILL BE USED TO ENERGIZE SOVIET INDUSTRY WITH GAS.
THIS CHANGEOVER TO GAS WILL NOT ONLY COMPENSATE
FOR FALLING OIL PRODUCTION AND ALLOW FOR OIL TO
BE EXPORTED, IT WILL SET THE BASE FOR FURTHER
INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE NOT BE
           IN OTHER WORDS THE SOVIET EXPORTS OF GAS
POSSIBLE.
ARE GOING TO PAY FOR THE PIPELINE WHICH WILL TRANSFORM
AND EXPAND THE SOVIET ENERGY BASE WHICH IN TURN
SHOULD HAVE A PROFCUAC BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON SOVIET
INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY CAPABILITY. I REALIZE_I MAY
BE OVERSTATING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PIPELINE AND
THAT HANY OTHER FACTORS CAN DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC
SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE SOVIET UNION.
BUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NATURAL GAS IS
WITHOUT DOUBT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS IN
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE SOVIET UNION.
    THE SOVIET SYSTEM IS STRAINED AND TO BUILD THIS
PIPELINE THE SOVIETS MUST IMPORT MATERIALS SUCH
AS LARGE PIPE AND LARGE COMPRESSORS.
                                      DENYING THEM
PRODUCTS SUCH AS ROTORS WHICH COME FROM GE TECHNOLOGY
REQUIRES THE SOVIETS TO DO SOMETHING ELSE LIKE
REDESIGN, REDIRECT THEIR OWN CAPACITIES, PROCURE
ELSEWHERE, ETC.; THIS MEANS DELAYS, AND WHEN THEIR
CASH FLOW IS DOWN AND THEIR CREDIT STANDING IS
FADING. DELAYS COULD MEAN SERIOUS PROBLEMS.
PIPELINE COULD BE DELAYED BEYOND THE PERIOD NEEDED
TO COMPENSATE FOR THE ROTORS. THE QUESTION I POSE
IS WHY SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BAIL THE SOVIET
UNION OUT OF ITS PROBLEMS BY ALLOWING IT THE USE OF
OUR TECHNOLOGY?
    THE CONTRACTED-FOR GAS EXPORTS TO EUROPE WILL
PROBABLY BE MET EVEN THOUGH THE PIPELINE IS DELAYED
BUT ONLY BY DRAWING GAS FROM SOME OTHER USE IN
THE SYSTEM. ALL CF WHICH ADDS TO THE OVERALL STRAIN.
NOR WILL THE CASH THAT COMES FROM THESE EXPORTS OF
GAS SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS BECAUSE MOST OF IT WILL
BE DEVOTED FOR SEVERAL YEARS TO PAYING FOR THE
NEW PIPELINE.
    I DO (NOT LOOK UPON THIS ISSUE AS ONE OF
EUROPEAN DEPENDENCY (UNLESS THERE IS A THIRD
SOVIET TRANCHE TO EUROPE, I.E., A SECOND PIPELINE).
(NOR IS THE DOLLARS 8 TO 10 BILLION NEW CASH GENERATED BY
GAS SALES TO EUROPE THE RANKING PRIORITY OF CONCERN.
BAD AS IT IS, BECAUSE THAT CASH WILL BE USED FOR
SEVERAL YEARS TO PAY FOR THE IMPORTED MATERIALS.
IMPORTANT POINT IS THE SOVIETS ARE IN ECONOMIC
TROUBLE BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN DOING AND THEIR
OWN SYSTEM AND THE UNITED STATES IS PERFECTLY JUSTIFIED
IN NOT CHOOSING TO HELP THEM MAKE THE QUANTUM LEAP
FORWARD THAT WILL COME FROM THEIR EXPANDED USE OF
GAS. OUR POLICY NEED NOT BE CHARACTERIZED AS ECONOMIC
WARFARE; IT IS SIMPLY A DECISION NOT TO BAIL THEM OUT
                                                           . 20
EXDIS
STATE FOR JAMES BUCKLEY, PASS TO NSC FOR WILLIAM CLARK,
COMMERCE FOR OLMER, CEFENSE FOR FRED IKLE
```

Approved For Release 2008/08/13 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001403390007-0

(

(

(

(

(

```
Approved For Release 2008/08/13: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403390007-0
                                      SECRET
                         Z1A *14/07/82* *84:54*
              65 (STXX)
    OF THEIR TROUBLE OR SUPPORT THEIR EXPANSION, TAKEN
    AT A TIME WHEN THEIR AGGRESSIVENESS AROUND THE WORLD
    CONTINUES.
    8. I THINK IT IMPCRIANT EUROPEANS UNDERSTAND
    WHAT WE HOPE TO GAIN BY AN ECONOMICALLY WEAKENED
    SOVIET UNION. IN MY OPINION THEIR ABILITY TO
    SUPPORT EXTERNAL SUBVERSION AND AGGRESSION, I.. E.G.,
    CUBA, ETHICPIA, YEHEN, VIETNAM, EL SALVADOR,
ť
    NICARAGUA, AFGHANISTAN COULD BE SEVERELY LIMITED.
    SECOND, THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE FORCED BY INTROSPECTION
     AND COMPARISON TO MODIFY THE NATURE OF THEIR
(
     ECONOMIC SYSTEM.
     GALBRAITH
             NNNN
1
     NNDD
                                      SECRET
                                                                                  (.
                                                                                  (
                                                                                  ( .
```

Approved For Release 2008/08/13 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001403390007-0